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The Problem of International Understanding
By GOTTFRIED SALOMON DELATOUR
I N THE United States of Americathere are dreamers of a United States
of Europe. Those who believe in a fu-
ture world government consider the unity
or federation of Europe the most impor-
tant step toward a world community.
However, politically and culturally we
are faced with two or many Europes.
From the Elbe to Venezia Giulia runs a
dividing line between west and east.
This line goes through Germany. What
we call Europe or the Occident, West-
ern civilization or Pan-Europe, does not
extend very far east from the frontiers
of the old Roman Empire.
The German Reich of Bismarck tried
to overcome the fundamental differ-
ences between the Germans west and
east of the Elbe. There is a Germany
of the west and south up to the Roman
wall, the Limes Germanicus, which be-
longed to and was civilized by the Ro-
man Empire, the Roman Catholic
Church, the Renaissance, and Classi-
cism ; and there is a colonial Germany-
Prussia, a feudal-military layer over a
Slavic population. The old distinction
of German liberals between political
and cultural unity, between might and
mind, is influenced by the heterogeneity
of Germany.
It is evident that the actual border
line of the present occupation does not
correspond exactly to this boundary be-
tween the two Germanies, and that we
have unnecessarily abandoned the land
of the old Saxons, Middle Germany, to
a new Slavic infiltration. A thousand
years of Germanization will be liqui-
dated now, and, in the reversal of the
tide, the frontier at the Elbe or per-
haps at the Oder will be the dividing
line between two Europes.
However, the political struggle be-
tween the Germanic and Slavic peoples
is not the only division. Romanic Eu-
rope, the Western civilization centered
in France, is entirely different from
central European development. The
Slavic, Germanic, and Romanic Eu-
ropes have not only different languages,
but different sets of traditions, customs,
and values, and different styles of litera-
ture, art, morals, and religion. How-
ever, Protestantism and Catholicism are
united in a common opposition against
eastern Christendom. Only in the
border regions from the Baltic Sea
and Poland to Czechoslovakia and
Croatia has the influence of Western
Christendom been extended across the
frontier. Eastern Christendom, since
the fall of Constantinople, is the suc-
cessor and heir to Byzantium. The
idea of Moscow as the Third Rome fol-
lowing the Rome of antiquity and the
Middle Ages was prevalent in all con-
ceptions of Russia’s mission. In the
nineteenth century the Slavophiles de-
veloped this idea in a messianic view of
the regeneration and reform of a de-
cadent Europe by the native and origi-
nal tradition of caesaropapism, the unity
of spiritual and temporal power. The
idea of Russia as the savior and the
Orthodox Church as the model of com-
munity has influenced the policy of Pan-
Slavism for a century.
SOVIET EXPANSION
Nevertheless, there has been an am-
bivalent Russian mind since Peter the
Great. The long controversy between
the Westerners who recognize the suc-
cess of Western science and technology
and the Slavophiles who desire the Rus-
sification of the Balts, the Poles, the
Slovaks, and the southern Slavs con-
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tinues in actual Russian history. The
Bolshevik Revolution tried by indus-
trialization to catch up with western
progress, but at the same time regarded
Russia as in revolt against Europe, des-
tined to lead the world along the path
of regeneration. The occupation of
strategic outposts as bulwarks of se-
curity and the temporary retreat into
&dquo;socialism in one country&dquo; were differ-
ent methods of making up the time lag
between the developments in East and
West. The new expansion is without
limits. Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics is the new title of a Russian
empire-which title significantly does
not mention Russia. It heralds a world
empire through world revolution.
We have witnessed the defeat and re-
treat of Pan-Germanism and of the Ger-
man assault on Europe. The Germans
were not thinking of a state, but of a
Reich similar to the Roman Empire of
the German nation. Bismarck’s Reich
was only Little Germany, without Aus-
tria and all the minorities in central and
southern Europe of German extraction
and culture. Together with the Ger-
mons abroad, Hitler’s propagandists
counted 100 million Germans. German
colonization and acculturation in the
east is now terminated by the new mi-
nority policy expelling whole popula-
tions and shifting them to the &dquo;home-
l~,nd.&dquo;
The result of National Socialism is
not only the extinction of the German
cultural element in Slavic countries, but
also the disintegration of the social
structure of central Europe. We must
not forget that Germans never passed
through a revolution, like the English
and the French. The middle class .never
came to power. They were a mass
fluctuating between feudalism and pro-
letarianism. Therefore, liberty and the
democratization of liberties were al-
ways overshadowed by the need for pro-
tection against the rising proletarian
movement. The proletarization of the
whole nation is now a fact and a temp-
tation to the Soviets to expand their
power with a promise of alliance.
SEPARATISM
Europeans scarcely realized how much
of the variety and richness of their
civilization they owed to their common
Christian tradition. For a thousand
years they received a spiritual and
ethical education. With the seculariza-
tion of culture, separatism was encour-
aged and the nation-state of the French
Revolution became a model. National-
ism brought together the fragmented
Italian and German rules in centralized
states. Freedom of the state was more
important than freedom of men; liber-
ties had to be sacrificed for national
unity and security.
With industrialization, a policy of
self-protection and progressive autarky
set in. Customs unions and free trade
areas were always limited. Economy
(which is always political economy)
gave no impetus to a larger unity. Eco-
nomic nationalism brought new divi-
sions. In the west, the whole of indus-
trial Europe could never have supported
its dense population without protection-
ism, and the richest countries were not
those that traded with each other, but
those that traded with the world. The
east remained backward and dependent.
There is thus a division of Europe into
an industrial west and an agricultural
east. In the separated parts of the old
Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Bal-
kans the peasants needed land and land
reform more than industrial products.
Economic exchange between these two
Europes was always difficult, and lately
possible only on a barter basis.
Hitler’s solution, in his attempt to
exploit all of Europe for German bene-
fit, was the centralization of techno-
logical power in one country, depriving
all other countries of industrial capacity,
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machinery, and manpower. The requi-
site of such a system was a strong Ger-
man middle class, and the counter-
revolution of National Socialism ap-
peared at first to be a defense of and
for the middle classes against a pro-
letarian revolution. But for the sake
of industrial rationalization in a war
economy, all the small enterprises were
liquidated, and the new masses, power-
less and disorganized, were reduced to
a proletarian status. The mass leaders
proclaimed a mythological neo-barbar-
ism of self-sacrifice for the sake of a
collectivity of a superior race. All the
resistance movements in occupied coun-
tries incorporated in Hitler’s unity of
Europe had to stress the idea of inde-
pendence for all nations, small or large.
EUROPEAN FEDERATION AND
INTERNATIONALISM
The polemical literature of the under-
ground emphasized the defense of the
Occident, first conceived by the Prime
Minister of Henry IV- of France, Sully.
The modern political and cultural idea
of a united Europe was a result of the
French Revolution. Napoleon I pre-
sented himself as the executor of a
European mission; he confessed to Las
Cases that he dreamed of a victory of
liberty and equality and one constitu-
tion for all countries of Europe. &dquo;The
Russian war ought to have been the
most popular of modern times....
Europe would soon in that way have
made in fact but one people, and every-
one, traveling all over it, would always
have found himself in the common
fatherland.&dquo; 1 The ideal of enlighten-
ment to unite interests and opinions,
sentiments and principles, codes and
customs, was a part of his legend.
The United States Constitution ap-
peared to the French revolutionists as
the realization of their dreams, and our
Ambassador Benjamin Franklin sug-
gested an imitation of the American
federation: &dquo;I do not see why you might
not in Europe carry the Project of good
Henry IV into Execution by forming a
Federal Union and One Grand Republic
of all its different States and King-
doms.&dquo;
Before the Congress of Vienna and
Metternich’s idea of a &dquo;Concert of
Europe&dquo; of sovereign states, Conte de
Saint-Simon, the founder of French so-
cialism, wrote on the reorganization of
European society ( 1814) .2 2 His grand
idea was based on the new industrialism
and the development of public educa-
tion. However, the industrial revolu-
tion, really unique in the history of
civilization, did not change the political
ahd social notions inherited from the
preindustrialized world; liberalism and
nationalism developed a kind of state
which monopolized not only arms and
taxes, but also education and history.
In the crisis of 1848 and at a Con-
gress of Peace, Victor Hugo again
evoked the ideal of European fraternity
in the United States of Europe. It was
more a republican policy against the
dynasties than an antinationalist mani-
festation, like the pacifist and socialist
movements after 1870 appealing to part
of the people to unite against the mili-
tary or capitalist ruling classes.
The &dquo;First Socialist International&dquo;
developed a new idea of international-
ism, based on the industrial develop-
ment ; the dictatorship of the proletariat
should hasten the &dquo;withering away&dquo; of
the nation-state, in spite of the admira-
tion of the Marxists for the Jacobins of
the French Revolution. Proudhon alone
opposed the Marxist idea of a great cen-
tralized society relying upon the cul-
tural principle which is traditionally
1 Emmanuel de Las Cases, M&eacute;morial de
Sainte-H&eacute;l&egrave;ne, Nov. 11, 1816.
2 Pierre Renouvin, Les id&eacute;es et les projets
d’union europ&eacute;ene au XIXe si&egrave;cle, Dotation
Carnegie, Bulletin 6, 1931.
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connected with community, region, or
the small nation.3 3
In a secular age a pseudo religion-
the nation-is today the object of wor-
ship to millions for whom church serv-
ices are meaningless. All the prophets
of a supranational community hoped
that this national religion, with its sym-
bols, rites, legends, and heroes, would
become a matter of private concern like
the confessions of Christian religion
after the Thirty Years’ War. They
maintained the principle of cultural
autonomy and international tolerance.
The argument that a federation of Eu-
rope would destroy culture, folklore,
and arts and crafts was met by Rdouard
Herriot in his book Europe, in which he
cited the great enrichment that has al-
ways come to a country through contact
with other cultures, particularly since
the Renaissance. However, every na-
tional state has tried to use general edu-
cation to safeguard its power and add
to its own prestige. An explanation of
the failure of the League of Nations
and of the principle of self-determina-
tion of the national state was sought in
the premature universalism-the at-
tempt to include the whole world at
once.
The idea of regional and federal unity
cropped up again during the critical in-
terval between the two world wars.
Clement Attlee, parliamentary spokes-
man of the British Labor Party, de-
clared officially in 1939:
There must be acceptance of the principle
that international anarchy is incompatible
with peace, and that in the common inter-
est there must be recognition of an inter-
national authority superior to the indi-
vidual States.... Europe must federate
or perish.
Between the two wars Great Britain,
which is now calling for European fed-
eration, was moving toward a closer
and more exclusive Commonwealth and
did not like to consider herself primarily
part of Europe. Liberals like Sir Ar-
thur Salter felt that any European eco-
nomic union was impossible without the
surrender of political sovereignty, for
which England was quite unprepared.
There was no hope from the socialist
side, because the Social Democrats
found themselves more nationalist than
socialist in war and postwar times. The
only step in the direction of Pan-Europe
was Aristide Briand’s declaration of a
new policy of collective security.4 4
PAN-EUROPE
On September 5, 1929, Briand asked
the Assembly of the League of Nations
whether a &dquo;regional understanding,&dquo;
such as the League Covenant itself rec-
ommended, might not be attempted in
Europe through &dquo;a political and social
link which of course would in no way
affect the sovereignty of the parties in-
volved.&dquo; In the spring of the following
year, at the Assembly’s suggestion, he
adressed his famous &dquo;Memorandum on
the Organization of a Regime of Euro-
pean Federal Union&dquo; to twenty-six
European governments, outlining his
proposal and asking for their comments.
Briand insisted that there could be
no solution of the problems growing out
of economic nationalism without politi-
cal security, but for that he proposed
little more than a new version of
France’s old demand for binding pledges
of mutual assistance against aggression.
He would set up a kind of European
legislature on the model of the League’s
Assembly and Council, which would
tackle the problems of the elimination
of barriers to the free &dquo;circulation of
goods, capital and individuals,&dquo; the &dquo;es-
tablishment of a common market,&dquo; and
the &dquo;rational organization o.f production
and of European exchanges.&dquo;
3 P. J. Proudhon, Du principe f&eacute;d&eacute;ratif, 1863.
4 Arthur Bingham, The United States of Eu-
rope, 1940, pp. 55 ff.
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European economic thought at that
time was still dominated by the myth
of American prosperity, which was be-
lieved to be due to the great &dquo;common
market&dquo; of a continental area. By the
time the twenty-six governments re-
plied, the Great Depression was well
under way. Even Britain was soon to
abandon free trade, and every country
was desperately trying to save its own
economy at the expense of _ those of its
neighbors.
Between the two world wars Count
Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi outlined a
working program of the Pan-European
movement. He was fully aware that
Europe was not a geographical concept
and did not include England or Russia,
explaining that the Pan American
Union, as a model, does not include
either Canada or the European colonies
in America. Pan-Europe was to com-
prise twenty-seven states and four small
territories with a population of about
300 million people in Europe proper,
and with colonies in northern Africa
adding another hundred million people
to the European league.
The opposition to this movement was
to be found in nationalist and commu-
nist circles. However, Russia, carrying
out the first Five-Year Plan, was in no
position to block a consolidation of Eu-
rope, and it was obvious that no single
European nation could be a match for
an industrialized Russia. As early as
1923 Coudenhove-Kalergi predicted that
&dquo;the moment Russia recovers from her
internal disruption, not Poland nor Ru-
mania nor Czechoslovakia will be able
to stem her onrush toward the West,
and still less will the disarmed states of
Hungary, Austria and Germany be able
to do so.&dquo; The logical conclusion was
that Europe had but two courses of ac-
tion : to consolidate in a federal union
or to succumb to a Russian conquest.
The main reason for the failure of
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plan was its lack
of appeal to the masses. The Pan-
European plan was submitted to and
applauded only by the representatives
of the peoples of the Continent, and it
is now, with some modifications, again
a question for &dquo;the parliaments of Euro-
pean states with independent foreign
policies.&dquo; The parliamentary &dquo;Gallup
poll&dquo; on European federation under-
taken by Coudenhove-Kalergi had the
amazing result of 612 yesses to 12 noes.
This time, Britain is in the forefront.
Among the 107 members of the British
Parliament who have voted for Euro-
pean federation, 64 belong to the Labor
Party and 34 to the Conservatives.5
Winston Churchill, speaking on May
14, 1947 before an assembly of almost
all political parties and churches, made
himself the advocate of the new Euro-
pean movement. He declared that the
real demarcation between Europe and
Asia is no natural frontier, but a spir-
itual conception. His faith in the fu-
ture of Europe is based on the commu-
nity of French-English interests, which
he recognized in his dramatic offer of
common citizenship made in June
1940; the accomplished fact of the
Scandinavian union; and the customs
union between the Netherlands and Bel-
gium. Churchill stressed the cultural
message of Europe to every part of the
world. Religion, law, arts, science, in-
dustry, throughout the world bear the
stamp of European origin.
This great vision would also fill the
dangerous vacuum in Germany or the
Germanies, a federation of German
states accepted from the beginning as
full members of the greater European
federation.
AMERICA AND EUROPE
While the deadlock between the East-
ern and the Western world continues, a
5 Declaration at the second annual New
York Herald Tribune Forum on a Parliament
for Europe, March 9, 1947.
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resolution to rally American support
for a project of Pan-Europe has been
introduced in both Houses of Congress
by Senator Fulbright and Representa-
tive Boggs. As Senator Fulbright
stated, the resolution does not mean
that we would undertake to impose an
American type of federation on the Old
World, but that we would pledge sup-
port to the forces already working to
put an end to the nationalistic anarchy
in Europe. Now, if we allow ourselves
such long-term objectives as peace
through federation, we not only face a
difficult job of re-creating a continent,
but we have to ask ourselves whether
we are prepared for this moral and ma-
terial support and whether we are sure
that our destiny is tied up with Europe’s
destiny.
This objective is not only a question
of power diplomacy; it is based on a
deep cultural and moral unity between
the United States and western Europe.
Europe is the birthplace of our civiliza-
tion, and the dominant note of our Con-
stitution was first struck in French and
British political thought. Even when
the United States raised bars against
further European immigration, it re-
mained linked to the European nation-
alities. We have a community of faith
and ethics, the heritage of the New
World from the Old. America has
achieved a federation of states and an
assimilation of nationalities which serves
as a model for European idealists.
Americans are proud of all’ the bene-
fits of their Constitution, and conclude
that the remedy for all the troubles in
the mother countries is federation.
Speaking before the National Publish-
ers Association last January, John Fos-
ter Dulles, Republican adviser on for-
eign policy, quoted Hamilton’s famous
dictum: &dquo;To look for a continuation of
harmony between a number of inde-
pendent, unconnected sovereignties in
the same neighborhood would be to dis-
regard the uniform course of human
events and to set at defiance the ac-
cumulated experience of ages.&dquo; Mr.
Dulles concentrated not on the whole
of Europe-a vast and undefined en-
tity-but on western Europe. Further,
he applied the idea to what is the crucial
problem of Europe-Germany. Any
hope for European unity will dissolve
and come to nothing if we simply build
Germany back into its prewar pattern.
In that event, instead of playing its part
in a new Europe, Germany may try
again to digest Europe.
Mr. Dulles illustrated his point by
stressing the Rhine. If this economic
heart of the Continent can be made to
work not only for Germany but for
neighboring states, then
western Europe at least ... could develop
into a more prosperous and stable land.
That, however, is not likely to happen if
the German peace treaty merely re-estab-
lishes Germany as a single economic unity,
subject to only German political control.
... If such dispositions are made Ger-
many’s western neighbors-France, Bel-
gium, and Holland-will hesitate to or-
ganize their economies into dependence on
a source which may again be controlled by
vengeful German rulers ... rather than
risk that the nations of western Europe
will probably annex bits of Germany as
they can and, as to the rest, accept eco-
nomic separation.6
PROBLEM OF EDUCATION
We are faced with a problem which
has a long perspective, the problem of
education for unity and community of
European nations. This is not a ques-
tion of charity or of social engineering,
but an effort of intellectual co-operation.
The powers meeting at the San Fran-
cisco Conference in June 1945 accepted
a proposal by the Chinese Government
that educational and cultural relations
be included within the scope of United
6 Fortune, Vol. 35, No. 3, March 1947.
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Nations activity, thus avoiding the pit-
fall of &dquo;national sovereignty&dquo; which
had wrecked the attempt of the League
of Nations to include them. The little
republic of Haiti, whose representative
twenty-three years before had stood
alone in the League Assembly to plead
for an agency for education, again pro-
posed an agency &dquo;to see to it that edu-
cation should never be used to propa-
gate ideas contrary to peace.&dquo; It was
finally agreed to make specific mention
of &dquo;international cultural and educa-
tional co-operation&dquo; in Article 55 of
the United Nations Charter.
The Allied ministers subsequently set
the date for their next conference in
London for November 1945; and on
August 1 they released the text of a
draft constitution for an Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization of
the United Nations (UNESCO).
The law affiliating the United States
with this organization authorized the
establishment of a National Commission
to serve as an official &dquo;bridge&dquo; between
the Government and private, voluntary
groups within the United States. The
United States National Commission,
consisting of 90 (later increased to
100) leaders in American educational,
scientific, and cultural life, held its first
meeting in Washington, September 23-
26, 1946. In its report the Commission
agreed that immediate urgency put dis-
semination of culture in the first place,
and proposed a world-wide radio net-
work, expanded agencies, and motion
pictures.
The real measure of UNESCO’s suc-
cess will be found in what happens in
the minds of men located in all parts of
the world and over a period of many
years to come. It will not be measured
by the amount of organization of a bu-
reaucratic agency, except in the im-
mediately urgent reconstruction and re-
habilitation field.
DIFFICULTIES AND PROGRAMS
UNESCO will have great difficulty to
find a neutral formula in the conflict of
ideas. Obviously, the program to be
devised cannot differ greatly from the
present major national cultural rela-
tions programs. Nor can one expect,
as a challenge to cultural competition,
a ready-made answer to all world-wide
conflicts. It is the impression of par-
ticipants and observers that in all gath-
erings of UNESCO, as in the meetings
of the United Nations, there is as much
struggle for position as endeavor to find
a formula of co-operation.
We have only to look at a few simple
facts about contemporary foreign policy
to see that this activity of cultural com-
petition is very realistic. What we now
term &dquo;programs of cultural relations&dquo;
may be demonstrations of the art of
making friends and influencing people,
but they are also reliable aids in the
business of securing allies. Formidable
sums are being expended on these pro-
grams, and these sums will doubtless
grow larger as the policies to be fol-
lowed by the several nations are trans-
lated into practical effort. Libraries,
book stores, publications, institutes,
schools, radio programs, films-all these
and more are being lavishly supported
by alert and astute foreign offices.
The principal question we ask about
UNESCO is this: How and to what ex-
tent can it temper the process of the
conflict of ideas? We may answer first
of all that of course it cannot do so by
setting up any one philosophy as bind-
ing and orthodox. UNESCO is first
and foremost the provision of oppor-
tunity for participation in world-wide
discussion. The right of freedom to
speak and be heard may be taken away
by dictators, but in the final analysis it
can be destroyed altogether only by
failure to make use of it. While the
practical purpose of the discussion
8
which UNESCO creates is to serve the
peace of the world by mitigating blind
nationalistic hatreds based on mutual
misunderstanding or mutual arrogance,
the sources of such hatreds are so com-
plex that practically no subject should
be eliminated from the discussion.
Here we come face to face with the
most difficult single problem which
UNESCO faces-the problem of rela-
tionships with Russia. UNESCO has
not been able to elicit from the Krem-
lin any expression of opinion about
UNESCO, not even an official news-
paper editorial, nor have Americans
succeeded in bringing about any altera-
tion of Russian policy in the domain of
international relations. It is evident
that UNESCO will to a great extent
fail unless the attitude of Russia toward
other peoples can be changed.
&dquo;MARX AND FREUD AT UNESCO&dquo;
The adviser of the American delega-
tion to the first general conference in
Paris, James Marshall, now member of
the New York Board of Education,
wrote an excellent article entitled:
&dquo;Marx and Freud at UNESCO,&dquo; which
appeared in the summer edition of the
American Scholar .7 I wish to draw
from this article, which boldly points
out the antithetical premises which must
be reconciled if UNESCO is to succeed.
James Marshall understands that the
issue at hand is a conflict of ideas
transcending the organizational frame-
work, and he comes to the conclusion
that mere adherence of the so-called
Soviet nations to UNESCO will not
eliminate the cleavage.
The acceptance of Marx or Freud,
economic determinism or psychological
healing, opens wide the gap between
methods of conflict. and those of co-
operation, between ruthless surgery and
medical art. Even if any other kind of
psychology is substituted for the fash-
ionable psychoanalysis, the problem re-
mains the same in terms of objective
versus subjective conditions of chang-
ing the world or transforming men.
The danger is that we misconstrue
the consequences of this divergence of
premises. American methods and pre-
dilections push us to the naive assump-
tion that such differences can be re-
moved by appealing to the facts.
Facts are &dquo;romances of the mind,&dquo; as
the great historian Henry Osborn Taylor
wrote in a book of this title. A true
understanding of the issue would make
it clear that there are several inter-
pretations of the facts, according to
one’s perspective. We assume, accord-
ing to our customs and traditions in
politics and business, that discussions
lead to agreement; however, there must
be a common basis of understanding.
Let us exchange ideas, we say, let us
make treaties permitting the free flow
of news and motion pictures, and the
frontiers of the mind will automatically
be opened. Partial concessions are to
provide a modus vivendi.
One need not accept the correctness
of dialectical materialism to concede
that the pangs of want affect the sta-
bility of peace. They arouse anxieties
which deprive the sufferers both of the
power of reason and of the capacity
to understand and have sympathy for
others. Even if we share the belief in
materialism and concede that cultural
education can set in after certain primi-
tive economic conditions are given, we
cannot accept and be content with eco-
nomic determinism. James Marshall
said:
We would indeed be blind if we did not
recognize that the very transplanting of
families and the instability of family life
have a decided relationship to material
things and institutions, to bread and coal
and cloth and bricks, to trade and com-
munication.7 American Scholar, 1947, pp. 304-11.
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A QUESTION OF TOLERANCE
It is not economic co-operation, busi-
ness relations with state trusts, not
even good will and good intentions that
can adjust the differences and create a
fellowship among those with different
backgrounds. We are facing a prob-
lem of quasi-religious intolerance. Tol-
erance is not an affair of self-restraint;
it is the admission of one’s doubts.
Tolerance requires a skeptical sense of
humor more than a serious goodness of
intent. Marshall says: &dquo;If we wish to
achieve a ’frontierless world of the
mind’-as Anne O’Hare McCormick
formulated it-we must first look to
lower barriers where commerce can find
entrance.&dquo;
This is the formula of compromise in
terms of a business world. There is an
element of misunderstanding which, un-
fortunately not realized, creeps into the
scheme. An American overlooks the
experience of Europeans that the po-
litical groups are no longer conserva-
tives and liberals, tories and whigs of
the same society with different shades
of opinion, but are believers in differ-
ent philosophies of life and society.
In a revolution against the whole exist-
ing traditional law and order the fanatics
and dogmatists have a universal gospel,
and the jealousy of their high priests
does not permit any doubt that they
guard the depository of the right faith.
Just as in medicine, so in politics nowa-
days quacks offer cures of all evils by
panaceas.
THE MATERIALISTIC VIEW
This whole problem came into the
open in the only speech of a Soviet-
oriented delegate from Yugoslavia at
the opening conference in his attack on
the very idea of UNESCO. Vladislav
Ribnikar presented the reaction of his
government, and presumably that of
the Soviet Union, to UNESCO. Mr.
Ribnikar first quoted those phrases of
the UNESCO constitution which state
&dquo;that since wars begin in the minds of
men, it is in the minds of men that the
defenses of peace must be constructed&dquo;
and &dquo;that ignorance of each other’s
ways and lives has been a common
cause, throughout the history of man-
kind, of that suspicion and mistrust be-
tween the peoples of the world through
which their differences have all too often
broken into war.&dquo; As to these pro-
visions, Mr. Ribnikar stated:
I feel certain that any man acquainted
with the study of history and who has un-
derstood the origins of the war which has
just ended, will agree that such arbitrary
conclusions show a lack of scientific knowl-
edge, that they give an inaccurate picture
of the causes which, in the history of man-
kind, have provoked wars between na-
tions, and that it is impossible with such
principles to remove effectively the causes
of war.
&dquo;It was because of such principles,&dquo;
he said, &dquo;that the Yugoslav Government
had been prevented from proposing the
ratification of the UNESCO constitu-
tion to their Parliament.&dquo;
In the view of Mr. Ribnikar, the phi-
losophy of UNESCO entirely rejects
materialistic philosophy.
If materialistic thought were to be banned,
it would amount to holding up the creative
advance of younger peoples. This would
deprive science of the methods by which
it has become science, and in the last in-
stance, would amount to subjecting science
to metaphysics.
James Marshall says, &dquo;The ’science’
which proclaims that progress can only
be achieved by the destruction of one
social order in conflict with another, is
a formula for antagonism and a ra-
tionalization to justify, if not to induce,
aggression.&dquo; If one believes the only
way to achieve the dialectical synthesis,
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the attainment of a united world, is to
go through the bloody struggle of class
conquest, then obviously the achieve-
ment of social equality and ’collabora-
tion by repressing aggressive drives or
harnessing them to constructive pur-
poses must appear to be &dquo;arbitrary con-
clusions&dquo; and to present an &dquo;inaccurate
picture.&dquo;
EMOTIONAL CONFLICT REMAINS
But the solution of economic in-
equality and the problems of maldis-
tribution will not dispose of those forms
of aggression arising out of the emo-
tional patterns created in the family
circle. Freud pointed this out:
By abolishing private property one de-
prives the human love of aggression of one
of its instruments, a strong one undoubt-
edly, but assuredly not the strongest. It in
no way alters the individual differences in
power and influence which are turned by
aggressiveness to its own use, nor does it
change the nature of the instinct in any
way.
In Marshall’s words,
the seeds of delinquency and bigotry and
aggression would still be sown. It is only
when educational forces, both formal and
informal, are adapted to meeting such prob-
lems that the task of constructing the de-
fenses of peace can be completed.
This is the problem of conciliation:
How much of conflict, how much of dis-
trust and aggression, can be solved or
resolved by attention to the minds of
men and to their emotional relations to
one another?
EARLY ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET
RUSSIA
Understanding of Russia is not a mat-
ter of information or of acceptance of
socialist indoctrination and regimenta-
tion. It presupposes the acknowledg-
ment of the industrial achievements and
the military victory of a far distant
country with which we were allied in the
crusade against fascism. We cannot
understand . the situation without the
historical background.
From the time it became necessary
for the United States to participate in
the war against Germany, Italy, and
Japan, we were fighting for democracy,
but much more was at stake: civiliza-
tion, the common possession and tradi-
tion of the Western nations. There-
fore the alliance with a totalitarian state
in the war against totalitarian states
looked strange to those who had not
forgotten the attitude of the United
States toward the Soviet regime since
1917. American troops participated in
the Allied effort to overthrow the Sovi-
ets. The belief that this regime was
doomed to failure and that it was
threatening our system prevented the
recognition of the Russian Government.
However, this did not prevent a con-
siderable trade between the two coun-
tries. It was certainly not a problem
of how to do business with the big,
state-controlled corporations of Russia.
By the time Franklin Delano Roose-
velt was elected, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics had reached a po-
sition of great influence, and, expanding
his good-neighbor policy to Eurasia,
President Roosevelt expressed his re-
grets &dquo;that these great peoples between
whom a happy tradition of friendship
existed for more than a century to their
mutual advantage&dquo; had no direct com-
munication. &dquo;Impelling was the desire
of both countries for peace&dquo; and hence
the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions.
Beginning with the friction ranging
from inability to adjust the claims of
old war debts with the Soviet counter-
claims of compensation for intervention
against Communist activities, a real
hostility developed when the Soviets
signed the treaty of nonaggression with
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Germany in 1939. Stalin had become
the accomplice in the conspiracy against
the West.
FROM FRICTION TO FRIENDSHIP
But almost over night a complete re-
versal was brought about by Hitler’s
attack on the U.S.S.R. and our interest
in an unexpected ally. The very ac-
tions of the Soviets that had antago-
nized American opinion appeared in
retrospect as a farsighted measure of
defense. The pact with Germany gave
the Soviets time to build up their arma-
ment ; the pushing back of the Finnish
frontier and the annexation of the Baltic
states gave them outposts; the Five-
Year Plans looked now like a shrewd
preparation of a war economy; and
finally, the successes of the Russian
armies produced a great upsurge of re-
spect and admiration.
There was even a tendency to say
that between the two countries there
was not so much difference after all. In
the interest of better relations one may
dwell upon the similarities of industrial
nations and of great powers which are
a melting pot of many nationalities,
and even more upon America as a
model for Russia of technical achieve-
ments and an economy of plenty. There
is even a slight resemblance in the aims
of both countries. Neither is based on
the old privileged-class system; both
are opposed to the Nazi system of na-
tions enslaved by a master race.8 8
However, to Americans even the new
Soviet constitution of 1936 has no
meaning. We do not like the system
of secret police prying into private af-
fairs, the concentration camps of mil-
lions of forced laborers, the restrictions
on foreign travel, the decrees which
freeze workers to their jobs, and so
forth. We try to understand the feel-
ing of insecurity of the Soviet Union
living under a threat of invasion, and
the backwardness of a country lacking
traditions of political freedom for mil-
lions of nomads and peasants unable to
read and write.
It was supposed that Russia would
develop in the direction of greater free-
dom and American concepts. On the
other side, in such fields as planning,
social security, and nondiscrimination
it was hoped that America would incline
to Soviet ideas. Beginning with the
assistance in the great famine of the
Ukraine and ending with the lend-lease
program providing the Soviets facing
defeat with the necessary mechanical
armament at the time of Stalingrad, we
believed there would be a basis for
good will and gratitude, mutual rec-
ognition and co-operation.
After victory, companions-in-arms of-
ten discover reasons for conflict among
themselves, and more intimate contact
merely emphasizes the distances that
separate them in spirit. The war con-
tinues in diplomacy, with different
means of measuring power.
The friends of Russia speculate that
she will fix her attention on the de-
velopment of her enormous internal re-
sources, and might intervene through-
out Europe only if Europe is organized
against her or is not organized at all.
If neither chaos nor an anti-Communist
crusade threatens her security, some
politicians think Russia is likely to
agree to a European settlement that she
thinks will make for peace.
SOVIET INTOLERANCE
In any event, the single item of Com-
munism on which we concentrate our at-
tention does not explain the more im-
portant fact that the Soviets represent
the strongest power in Europe-that the
U.S.S.R. is not a state but a federation
of nations in a new empire and a total
8 Albert R. Williams, "The Soviets and
America," Free World, Jan. 1943, pp. 70-72.
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system of civilization which is not only
alien but antagonistic to Western civi-
lization and society. Since Communism
is a revolutionary and intolerant con-
fession of faith of universal dimensions,
can it stop short of its goal of liquidat-
ing the old order in the world?
We are here concerned with the chal-
lenge of a system in which everybody is
a proletarian against a system in which
everybody is or wants to be a bourgeois.
The whole idea of rapprochement, con-
ciliation, and toleration is a middle-class
idea in Russian eyes. We must under-
stand the intolerance of a new ortho-
doxy. Assured that they have the right
faith, the adherents consider themselves
encircled and threatened by evil powers
and are suspicious of a &dquo;plot.&dquo; The
capitalist is the devil and the masses
of capitalist countries are misled. There
is no possibility of conversion for the
damned. The selected-not at all the
working classes in general-have to pass
through an educational dictatorship with
thought control and purges of the in-
telligence. The depersonalized citizen
of a collectivist machinery is not con-
tent with socialism in one country.
There is for a Marxist, only one in-
credible fact-that workers in the West-
ern democracies are not only gradually
raising their standards, but are organ-
ized in powerful unions which the
Marxists’ own revolution has pushed
aside. These reformists who are op-
posed to catastrophic change were con-
sidered Babbitts in I. Ehrenburg’s re-
port on America.9
EMPHASIS ON POWER
The role of the Soviets can be under-
stood only in their emphasis on power.
In international conferences they have
insisted on the distinction between great
and small nations. The Soviet leaders
always stress the fact that they were
victorious and that their regime has
met the test. They have been building
up a centralized regime in which all
the heterogeneous peoples forming the
Soviet Union were inflamed to defend
the fatherland by the same nationalistic
slogans as in other countries.
To build up the power of the regime
the people had to give up all hope of a
better life; and if the production of con-
sumer goods is kept at a minimum, the
question as to who owns the plants is not
so important, it seems to us. An all-
powerful bureaucracy with the largest
of standing armies has defended exactly
the same position of unrestricted sover-
eignty as did the most stubborn isola-
tionists. It is no longer a dispute be-
tween economic systems; the struggle is
tween different economic systems; the
struggle is between powers. Historical
experience can be cited to show that
greater unity in a country or on a conti-
nent or even world-wide community can
be achieved only by political means.
IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT
We are in an ideological war. The
importance of propaganda, mass pro-
duction of opinion, is symptomatic of
the new mass civilization. As early as
March 1919, Lenin created the first
governmental propaganda organization
to spread Marxist ideas as a new uni-
versal gospel and appeal to all op-
pressed national groups and exploited
classes. Marxist philosophy is dialecti-
cal, a belief in the conflict of ideas and
forces worked out in a historical proc-
ess. Ideas serve only as a weapon to
discredit the values and reasons of the
opponent. When the conflict in peace-
ful competition and discussion is re-
placed, in time, by war and revolution,
co-operation or community has lost its
meaning.
Suppose the Russians know all the
9 I. Ehrenburg’s report on America, Harp-
er’s Magazine, Dec. 1946.
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facts about the West, and that their
leaders are well informed about Ameri-
can corporations and unions, parties and
Senate debates; why is this knowledge
no basis for an understanding? It is
because we have different ideas about
public opinion and education. We are
living in the old age of discussion, think-
ing that the people must be well in-
formed and that through public debates
the truth will become evident as in a
law court. In Russia, discussion is al-
lowed only on local affairs and tech-
nical improvements. Education is in-
doctrination and initiation into the tech-
nical world. Nothing is so dangerous as
technology without humanism.
MACHINERY IS NOT ENOUGH
International understanding is not an
easy formula, because so many issues
are involved in the problem-differences
of religion, national loyalties, levels of
education. It is futile to look for suc-
cess to the creation of an international
agency until in each country the will
for international co-operation has been
cultivated. &dquo;You cannot make good
neighbors by the organization of courses
and entrust the inculcation of moral
standards to an organization. There
is no magic in administrative ma-
chinery
We must not assume that the tech-
nique for bringing about a new meeting
of the minds is already available.
Mere organization does not inspire
teachers with ideas that transcend na-
tional culture. The Institute of Intel-
lectual Co-operation shows that the
technique of co-ordination was not able
to overcome international estrangement.
It seems realistic to concentrate on the
minimum requirements of international
order. Constant frustration is likely to
lead to the cynical idea that nothing but
brutality and stupidity can be expected
in power politics.
BELIEF IN WORLD COMMUNITY
However, that world community is the
political ideal of our age can be demon-
strated even by the theory of the Marx-
ists, who believe that the world will be-
come. one through international tech-
nology in a new social order. The dif-
ferences are on the cultural plane. If
community is a consensus of values, as
MacIver pointed out, the pursuit of
common ends does not presuppose an
agreement on all matters, but it does
require allegiance to a common cause.
We realize how great the regress of uni-
versally accepted cultural principles and
how different the cultural levels of many
peoples are, but we have a passionate
belief in greater unity and community
in mankind as the meaning of history.
Politics is a question of timing. All
revolutions are coming of age and at an
end of expansion. At this moment of
history we can achieve only a unity of
.the Western world. We are not yet in
&dquo;One World,&dquo; but we believe in it.
In the United States as a world power
lies the hope of fulfilling the mission and
idea of the new world, of transcending
the limits of national policy and cul-
ture, and of defending the rights of men
in a free society. Let me conclude with
the exhortation of Alexander Hamilton
in The Federalist:
It has been frequently remarked that it
has been reserved to the people of this
country, by their conduct and example, to
decide the important question, whether so-
cieties of men are really capable or not of
establishing good government from reflec-
tion and choice, or whether they are for-
ever destined to depend for their political
constitutions on accident and force. If
there be any truth in the remark, the crisis
10 I, L. Kandel, "Re-education on a World
Scale," in World Order: Its Intellectual and
Cultural Foundations (ed. by F. E. Johnson,
1945), p. 171.
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at which we are arrived may with pro-
priety be regarded as the era in which that
decision is to be made; and a wrong elec-
tion of the part we shall act may, in this
view, deserve to be considered as the gen-
eral misfortune of mankind.
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